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ABSTRACT
This article studies how accounting for the beneﬁts of recreational ﬁsheries affects the formation and stability
of an international ﬁsheries agreement (IFA) on the management of Baltic salmon stocks. The interaction be-
tween four countries is modelled through a partition function game, under two scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario,
countries take their participation decision for the IFA based only on the net present value of proﬁts from com-
mercial ﬁsheries. In the second scenario, the net present value of the recreational beneﬁts from angling is also
considered. The results show that accounting for recreational beneﬁts leads to the formation of the grand coa-
lition, whereas only partial cooperation occurs when payoffs are conﬁned to proﬁts from commercial ﬁsheries.
Keywords:Baltic salmon, bioeconomicmodelling, coalition games, international ﬁsheries agreements, non-market
values, shared ﬁsh stocks.
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INTRODUCTION
The non-cooperative management of an internationally shared ﬁsh stock implies a strategic in-
teraction between the harvesting countries, which often results in stock overexploitation and
rent dissipation (Munro 2007). In order to overcome these problems, international ﬁsheries
agreements (IFAs) on the exploitation of the resources are required. The legal framework set
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by the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations 1982) and the
UN Fish Stocks Agreement (United Nations 1995) stresses the relevance of these agreements
in the form of regional ﬁsheries management organizations (RFMOs).
The formation and stability of IFAs can be addressed through the use of coalition games; that
is, models in which players can join together. The foundation of coalition games can be traced
back to the seminal work by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). In the early 1960s, Thrall
and Lucas (1963) introduced a speciﬁc type of coalition game called a partition function game.
This type of game models the formation of an agreement endogenously and can be used to study
the stability of different agreements. Partition function games were revived in the 1980s (e.g.,
D’Aspremont et al. 1983; Hart and Kurz 1983), and the ﬁrst applications to environmental eco-
nomics occurred in the 1990s (e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 1994). Pintassilgo
(2003) introduced partition function games into the ﬁsheries economics literature.
Over the past decade, the literature on the application of partition function games to IFAs
has evolved signiﬁcantly (e.g., Pintassilgo and Lindroos 2008; Pintassilgo et al. 2010; Long
and Flaaten 2011) and is surveyed in Lindroos, Kronbak, and Kaitala (2007) and Pintassilgo,
Kronbak, and Lindroos (2015). These games are usually characterized by positive externalities
(PEs) from coalition formation. That is, when a country joins an IFA it generates a positive im-
pact on non-members’ payoffs, as they can freely beneﬁt from the cooperative efforts under-
taken by the IFA’s members. In this context, it is generally difﬁcult to stabilize IFAs with a large
number of countries (Pintassilgo et al. 2010). Moreover, the greater the beneﬁts from coopera-
tion the harder it is to achieve it, which is known as the ‘paradox of cooperation’ (Barrett 1994).
The present article ﬁlls a gap in this literature by exploring the role of non-market beneﬁts, such
as recreational beneﬁts for anglers, in the formation and stability of IFAs.
Fisheries can produce both market and non-market values, and the latter may form a signif-
icant part of the total economic value. Ferrara and Missios (1998), using a two-country, two-
period model, show that non-market values affect optimal harvesting strategies. Mazzanti (2001)
stresses the importance of accounting for the total economic value of whales in the interna-
tional management of the species. Gong and Heal (2014) conducted an experimental ﬁshing
game and concluded that people put a positive value on endangered species but, in general, re-
spond more to the use value than the existence value.
Even though the literature on the valuation of beneﬁts from recreational ﬁshing has devel-
oped (Johnston et al. 2006; Finnish Game and Fisheries Research Institute 2009; Carson 2012),
there are surprisingly few applications in which non-market valuation estimates have been in-
corporated into the bioeconomic analysis of environmental resources, such as ﬁsh. Kulmala,
Laukkanen, and Michielsens (2008) incorporated original contingent valuation results into
their bioeconomic ﬁsheries model, and Cook and McGaw (1996) applied auction prices of ﬁsh-
ing rights in estimating the recreational beneﬁt function for their bioeconomic framework. Re-
cently, Hyytiäinen et al. (2015) applied results of a contingent valuation study by Ahtiainen et al.
(2014) to a bioeconomic model in order to develop optimal nutrient abatement policies for the
Baltic Sea catchment area. Kragt (2013) applied the results of a choice experiment in analyzing
the costs and beneﬁts of water management. The reliability of valuation results is often ques-
tioned (e.g., Hyytiäinen et al. 2015) However, in the case of salmon anglers, the valued good can
be regarded as an experienced good, which makes valuation results more reliable compared to
the other types of environmental goods.
This work contributes to the literature by studying the impact of accounting for recreational
beneﬁts on international ﬁsheries management using Baltic salmon as a case study. For this pur-
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pose, the salmon ﬁsheries in the Baltic Sea are modelled through a four-player game in partition
function form. Two players (Denmark and Poland) have commercial ﬂeets only, whereas the
others (Finland and Sweden) have both commercial ﬂeets and substantial recreational ﬁsheries.
A disaggregated bioeconomic model developed by Kulmala et al. (2013) is updated and extended
to include the net beneﬁts from recreational ﬁsheries. Two scenarios are considered. In scenario 1,
countries decide on their membership in the IFA based on the net present value of the proﬁts
from their commercial ﬁsheries over a simulation period. In scenario 2, countries’ payoffs are
given by using the sum of the net present value of the proﬁts from commercial ﬁsheries and rec-
reational beneﬁts from angling.
This article is organized as follows. First, the salmon ﬁshery in the Baltic Sea is described.
Second, the bioeconomic model is presented, including the population dynamics and economic
models for commercial and recreational ﬁsheries. Third, the coalition formation game is de-
tailed. Fourth, the main results are presented in the scenario where payoffs derive only from
commercial ﬁsheries and also in the scenario where payoffs derive from both commercial and
recreational ﬁsheries. Fifth, the implications for the salmon stocks are discussed. Finally, the
main conclusions are highlighted.
SALMON FISHERIES IN THE BALTIC SEA
Baltic salmon is exploited throughout its migration routes at sea and in freshwater by ﬁshers
using various gear types. Over the last decades, the most common ﬁshing gears have been drift-
nets and longlines (LL) on the offshore feeding grounds, as well as trap nets (TN)—intercepting
maturing salmon on their coastal migration towards spawning rivers—and angling in the spawn-
ing rivers. Angling is the dominant recreational utilization of salmon stocks. Since the 1980s
both coastal and river ﬁsheries have increased the scale of their total catch, compared to offshore
ﬁshing (Karlsson and Karlström 1994; Romakkaniemi et al. 2003). In particular, angling and
other recreational catches have increased signiﬁcantly. Currently these catches account for one
third of the total salmon catch in the Baltic Sea region (ICES 2014).
International management of Baltic salmon ﬁsheries developed after a series of negotiations
and conventions in the 1950s and 1960s. Eventually the ‘Convention on Fishing and Conserva-
tion of the Living Resources in the Baltic Sea and the Belts’ was agreed upon between the Baltic
States, which also led to the establishment of the International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission
(IBSFC) in 1976. The IBSFC put into practice the aims of the convention, including interna-
tional ﬁsheries management. Several Baltic countries joined the European Union in the 1990s
and 2000s, which led to a wider adoption of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in the
area. The IBSFC managed the Baltic ﬁsh resources until 2005, and the organization ceased to
exist at the beginning of 2007. Thereafter, the ﬁsh resources have been managed by the Euro-
pean Union and by bilateral negotiations between the EU and Russia.
The European Commission has recently proposed a new long-term management plan for
Baltic salmon (European Commission 2011). The most important goal is to ensure a continued
recovery of natural reproduction and to eventually attain at least 75% of the estimated potential
smolt production capacity of wild salmon in each river, at the latest after ten years from the en-
try into force of the plan. The total allowable catch (TAC) based management considers only
commercial ﬁsheries. However, the management plan acknowledges both the commercial and
recreational user groups, lists objectives for the growing recreational ﬁshing sector, and pro-
poses several obligations to the member states for managing recreational ﬁshing in the spawn-
ing rivers according to the set of objectives and management practices. The plan also reminds
International Fisheries Management and Recreational Beneﬁts | 435
the member states about their obligations deriving from Article 66 of United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations 1982), which requires inter alia that the state of
origin of anadromous stocks and other states concerned should cooperate with regard to conser-
vation and management of these stocks.
BIOECONOMIC MODEL
The bioeconomic model adopted herein is based on Kulmala et al. (2013) and the stock-
assessment models currently used in Baltic salmon stock assessment (Michielsens and Murdoch
2004; Michielsens et al. 2006; Michielsens et al. 2008). A novelty of the present bioeconomic
model is that it accounts for recreational net beneﬁts from the river harvests. Moreover, the
model is forward looking, considers only wild salmon stocks, and the ﬂeet structure of each
player is updated to follow the EU ban on driftnets in the Baltic Sea (Council Regulation
(EC) No 2187/2005).
Figure 1 and table 1 present an overview of the part of the model that addresses the annual
cycle of feeding and spawning migration and sequential harvest of 15 wild salmon stocks by
different countries and with different gear types. The main countries harvesting salmon in
the Baltic Sea are considered to be: Poland (PL), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI) and Sweden
(SE). Together, these countries catch nearly 90% of the annual commercial salmon catch
(Kulmala et al. 2013). Poland, Denmark, and Finland use LL in the Baltic Main Basin. In the
model, this winter ﬁshery is assumed to occur in December. In summer, the maturing salmon
Figure 1. Schematic Presentation of the Annual Occurrence and Migration of Baltic Salmon and the Harvest
by Different Fisheries
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migrate to spawn in their natal rivers, and during the migration they are harvested by Finnish
and Swedish TN. Before spawning, the escaped salmon originating from a total of six rivers are
harvested by recreational ﬁshers (RI) in Sweden and Finland (table 1). The situation described
in the ﬁsheries corresponds to that prevailing in 2012, from March to the end of the year (ICES
2013).
POPULATION DYNAMICS MODEL
The population dynamics model is discrete in time, age-structured, and parameterized using the
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) stock assessment results (ICES
2012). This assessment is annually updated and peer-reviewed following the scientiﬁc quality as-
surance procedures of ICES ﬁsh stock assessments. The population dynamics of 15 wild salmon
stocks is as follows:
Na11, y11,au, se, st p Na,y,au, se, ste
–qa, y, f Ey, au, f e–ma, y, (1)
whereNa,y,au,se,st is the abundance of salmon by age (a), year (y), assessment unit (au), season (se),
and stock (st); qa,y,f is the catchability coefﬁcient by age, year, and ﬁshing method ( f ); Ey,au,f is
the ﬁshing effort; and ma,y the instantaneous natural mortality rate. The season dimension sep-
arates mature and immature salmon. The natural mortality of mature salmon is higher than the
average rate due to seal predation. The abundance of mature salmon migrating back to natal
rivers is given by:
Na,y,au, sep2, st p LaNa,y,au, sep1, ste
–qa, y, f Ey, au, f e–ma, y, (2)
Table 1. Fleet Structure of Each Country, Target Salmon Stocks of Each Fleet, and the Division of Salmon Stocks
into ICES Stock Assessment Units
Salmon Stock
Poland Denmark Finland Sweden
Longline Longline Longline Trap Net River Trap Net River
Assessment unit 1
Tornionjoki* x x x x x x
Simojoki* x x x x x
Kalixälven* x x x x x
Råneälven x x x x
Assessment unit 2
Piteälven x x x x x
Åbyälven x x x x x
Byskeälven* x x x x x x
Rickleån x x x x x
Sävarån x x x x x
Ume/Vindelälven* x x x x x x
Öreälven x x x x x
Lögdeälven x x x x x
Assessment unit 3
Ljungan x x x x x
Assessment unit 4
Mörrumsån* x x x x
Emån x x x
* Salmon stocks with recreational ﬁsheries.
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where (La) is the homing rate. The number of immature salmon is given by:
Na,y,au, sep1, st p 1 – Lað ÞNa,y,au, sep1, ste–qa, y, f Ey, au, f e–ma, y: (3)
Spawners are mature salmon that have escaped from the ﬁshery. By assumption, all salmon die
after spawning. The number of eggs produced is given by:
Negg,y,au, sep2, st p SSNa,y,au, sep2, strsa fey,au, sep2, (4)
where SSN is the number of spawners, rs is the sex ratio, and fe is the fecundity.
It takes salmon approximately four years to develop from eggs to smolts ( juveniles). At the
alevin stage, salmon face a reproduction disorder, known asM74-syndrome, which in some years
increases natural mortality in the juvenile phase (Karlsson and Karlström 1994). The egg-smolt
relationship follows a Beverton-Holt stock-recruitment function as follows:
Nsmolt,y14,au,sep2,st p
Negg ,y,au,sep2,st 1 – m
74
y
 
a 1 bNegg,y,au,sep2,st 1 – m74y
  , (5)
where a and b are recruitment parameters and the mortality rate caused by the M74-syndrome
is denoted by m74y .
COMMERCIAL FISHERY MODEL
The population dynamics model depends on the aggregate ﬁshing effort and catch by ﬁsh stock
assessment unit (i.e., a group of river stocks with similar sea migration is assumed to be exploited
similarly by sea ﬁsheries (table 1)). The catches per country and gear type are calculated by de-
ﬁning a coefﬁcient j p gX, where g is a parameter and X is a country’s (i) share of the aggre-
gate ﬁshing effort in a given assessment unit:X p
Ef ,i
Eau, f
, where Eau, f p o
n
ip1Eau, f , i (Kulmala 2009;
Kulmala et al. 2013).Throughout the model we denote the number of salmon available to gear
type f, with age a in assessment unit au, by Na,au,f. Similarly, pf,i and cf,i refers to the salmon
price and ﬁshing costs, respectively, of country i when using gear type f. The average catch
weight of salmon by sea-age1 and gear type is represented by Wa,f. The total effort of country
i using gear type f is the sum of ﬁshing efforts over all assessment units: Ef ,i p oauEau,f ,i.
As shown in table 1, the Finnish commercial Baltic Salmon ﬁsheries use LL and TN. The
Swedish commercial ﬁsheries are limited to TN, whereas Poland and Denmark use LL. In July,
the Finnish and Swedish ﬂeets use TN to harvest salmon that have escaped from the offshore
ﬁsheries. Due to the migration pattern, salmon from assessment units 1–3 and 2–3 are available
to the Finnish and Swedish ﬂeets, respectively. The annual proﬁts for the Finnish and Swedish
ﬂeets employing TN are given by equations (6) and (7), respectively:
PROFy,tn,FI p ptn,FI o
5
ap1
o
3
aup1
jau,tn,FINa,au,tn 1 – e
–qa,au,tnEau,tn
   
Wa,tn
 	
– ctn,FIEtn,FI (6)
PROFy,tn,SE p ptn,SE o
5
ap1
o
3
aup2
jau,tn,SENa,au,tn 1 – e
–qa,au,tnEau,tn
   
Wa,tn
 	
– ctn,SEEtn,SE: (7)
1. The salmon age ap0 refers to smolts, which are not harvested; agep1 refers to salmon that have spent 1 winter at sea
(1 SW); age p 2–5 refers to multi-sea-winter (MSW) salmon.
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In December, the immature salmon (eq. 3) are harvested in the offshore area (the Baltic Main
Basin) using LL. This ﬁshing method is used by all countries except Sweden (table 1). The an-
nual proﬁts for country i, employing LL is given by:
PROFy,ll,i p pll,i o
5
ap1
o
4
aup1
jau, ll, iNa,au, ll 1 – e
–qa,llEau,ll
  
 
Wa,ll
 
– cll ,iEll, i: (8)
The aggregate proﬁt of a country from commercial ﬁsheries is given by:
PROFy,i p o
f
PROFy,f ,i: (9)
RECREATIONAL FISHERY MODEL
Finland and Sweden also have recreational ﬁsheries that target salmon in their home rivers,
where they reproduce. The mature salmon escaping from the coastal trap nets are harvested
by anglers during the months of August and September when they reach their home rivers. Vir-
tually all salmon die after spawning. The annual river harvest is as follows:
RICr p o
5
ap1
Na,r 1 – e
–ha,r
 h i
Wa, (10)
where Na,r is the number of salmon available for the ﬁshery in river r, and ha,r is the age and
river-speciﬁc harvest rate, which is assumed to be constant over time and is parameterized using
the ICES (2012) estimate for 2011. Equation (10) implies that harvest by river ﬁsheries is deter-
mined by the number of salmon that escape both the offshore and the coastal ﬁsheries. Thus,
the effective recreational catch is determined by the ﬁshing effort undertaken in the commercial
ﬁsheries. Several authors have used river catch as an index of spawning run size, indicating that
the harvest rate in river ﬁshing is fairly constant (e.g., Chadwick 1985; Karlsson and Karlström
1994; Romakkaniemi et al. 2003). The Baltic salmon stock assessment model is ﬁtted to the his-
toric time series of river catches; these results indicate fairly similar harvest rates in river ﬁshing
over the last two decades (e.g., ICES 2012, 220).
In modeling the net beneﬁts of the recreational harvest, we follow Cook and McGaw (1996),
Kulmala et al. (2008), and Olaussen and Skonhoft (2008) and assume a linear marginal willing-
ness to pay (WTP) for recreational harvest. We assume away heterogeneity in the angler pop-
ulation, as our focus is on the qualitative effect of accounting for the beneﬁts from recreational
harvest on the potential for international cooperation (partial versus full cooperation). In prac-
tice, there will be differences in angler skill that affect individual catch rates; careful micro mod-
elling of angler heterogeneity would produce more accurate management guidelines but would
be unlikely to change the qualitative results on the extent of international cooperation. In order
to estimate the individual net beneﬁt function for an average ﬁsherman, we compute the integral
of the estimated marginal WTP between ﬁxed levels of current and improved catch. These in-
dividual net beneﬁts are then aggregated across the angler population to obtain parameters of
the aggregated net beneﬁt function:
NBRr p kRICr – nRIC
2
r , (11)
where k and v are functional parameters.
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Thus, for a given country, the aggregate recreational beneﬁts are given by:
NBRi p o
r
NBRr,i, where i ∈ FI, SEf g: (12)
Marginal WTP estimates based on previous contingent valuation studies are available for the
following rivers: Simojoki (Parkkila 2005), Tornionjoki (both in the Finnish and the Swedish
side) (Finnish Game and Fisheries Research Institute 2009), Byskeälven (Appelblad 2001), and
Ume/Vindelälven (Håkansson 2008). We assume that the number of anglers and their prefer-
ences in the Kalixälven andMörrumsån Rivers are similar to those in Tornionjoki (Swedish side)
and Byskeälven. Table 2 presents the estimated parameters of the net beneﬁt function for each
river.
There is a considerable literature on the economic valuation of the beneﬁts from recreational
ﬁshing (for a review see Johnston et al. 2006). Empirical evidence shows that recreational ﬁshing
beneﬁts are positively related to the ﬁsh catch and Johnston et al. (2006) found that this rela-
tionship is particularly strong for salmon species. The quadratic function form of the aggregated
net beneﬁt (equation (11)) implies that anglers’ beneﬁts increase at a decreasing rate with addi-
tional catch. This is supported by economic theory and empirical valuation studies on ﬁsheries
(Cantrell et al. 2004; Johnston et al. 2006). Moreover, in a number of bioeconomic frameworks
on salmon ﬁsheries, demand for recreational ﬁshing is speciﬁed as a linear function of catch
(Cook and McGaw 1996; Kulmala, Laukkanen, and Michielsens 2008; Olaussen and Skonhoft
2008).
COALITION FORMATION GAME
We model the formation of an international ﬁshery agreement (IFA) on the Baltic salmon ﬁsh-
eries through a two-stage partition function game with four players: Denmark, Finland, Poland,
and Sweden. This game, denoted as Г(N,P), is fully deﬁned by the set of players, Np {1,2,3,4},
and the partition function, P. This function associates the corresponding payoffs with each
possible coalition structure, or partition of the set of players. It is assumed that only one non-
trivial coalition; that is, with more than one player, will form. Thus, a coalition structure can
be represented by C p {S,1(n – m)}, where S represents the coalition composed of m mem-
bers, m ∈ {1,2,3,4}, and 1(n – m) the vector of n – m singletons. In this context, the overall coali-
tion structure is fully characterized by coalition S. In the ﬁrst stage, each country decides whether
to join the IFA (coalition) or be a non-member and act as a singleton. A single coalition and open-
membership setting (D’Aspremont et al. 1983) is assumed; that is, only one coalition forms and
any country is allowed to join it. These assumptions are based on the legal setting of the UNCon-
Table 2. Parameters of the River Net Beneﬁt Functions
Salmon Stock
Parameter
k v
Byskeälven 11.5 0.0006
Simojoki 46.5 0.006
Tornionjoki, Finland 22.5 0.0004
Tornionjoki, Sweden 24.4 0.003
Ume/Vindelälven 3.9 0.002
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vention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations 1982) and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (United
Nations 1995), according to which an internationally shared ﬁsh stock should be managed
through an RFMO. According to article 8 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, this organization
should be open to all countries with “a real interest in the ﬁsheries concerned.”
In the ﬁrst stage, the stable coalitions are determined using the concepts of internal and ex-
ternal stability, which is de facto a Nash equilibrium in membership strategies:
Internal stability:
Y*
i Sð Þ ≥
Y*
i Sn if gð Þ ∀ i ∈ S (13)
External stability:
Y
*
j Sð Þ ≥
Y
*
j S ∪ jf gð Þ ∀ j ∉ S, (14)
where p*i ðSÞ and ∏*j ðSÞ denote the payoff for member country, i, and non-member, j, when co-
alition S forms, respectively. p*i ðSnfigÞ represents the payoff for player i when it withdraws from
coalition S and becomes a singleton, and ∏*j ðS ∪ f jgÞ for the payoff for player j when it joins
coalition S. According to the concept of internal stability (13), no signatory should have an in-
centive to leave coalition S to become a non-signatory. External stability (14) means that
no non-signatory should have an incentive to join coalition S. Coalitions that are both internally
and externally stable are called stable.
In the second stage, given that some coalition S has formed in the ﬁrst stage, players choose
their commercial ﬁshing effort levels (see equations (6)–(9)). It is assumed that signatories de-
rive their equilibrium effort levels by maximizing the sum of the net beneﬁts of the coalition
members, and singletons maximize their own payoffs. The equilibrium of the second stage is
given by the Nash equilibrium ﬁshing efforts. Inserting these equilibrium ﬁshing efforts into
the payoffs for each coalition structure yields the partition function.
Regarding the sharing of coalitional payoffs among its members, we assume the “almost ideal
sharing scheme” (AISS), proposed by Eyckmans and Finus (2004). This scheme allocates to each
coalition member their free-rider payoff, ∏i(S \ {i}), plus a share, li(S), of the coalitional surplus
over the sum of free-rider payoffs, D(S):Y
i Sð Þ p
Y
i Sn if gð Þ 1 li Sð ÞCSURP Sð Þ, (15)
where CSURPðSÞ p oi ∈ S ∏iðSÞ – oi ∈ S ∏iðSnfigÞ, li ∈]0,1[ and oi ∈ Slip1. Thus, under the
AISS, coalition S is internally stable (see equation (13)) if and only if its coalitional surplus is
non-negative, CSURP(S) ≥ 0, irrespective of the sharing weightings, li(S). This sharing scheme
establishes a direct link between internal and external stability (equation (14)): if coalition S is
internally stable, then all coalitions S \ {i} are not externally stable.) Eyckmans and Finus (2004)
show that the AISS stabilizes those coalitions generating the highest possible aggregate payoff
among the set of coalitions with non-negative coalitional surplus. Moreover, under this scheme
the stable coalitions do not depend on the sharing weightings, li(S).
The game is solved backwards for the subgame perfect equilibrium. That is, we start by solv-
ing the second stage by determining the Nash equilibrium ﬁshing efforts for all possible coalition
structures. Then, using these equilibrium ﬁshing efforts the partition function is obtained, which
is the sharing of the coalition payoff among its members undertaken through the AISS. Finally,
applying the concepts of internal and external stability gives the equilibrium coalition structure.
Lastly, we test the game for two standard properties of IFA games: positive externalities (PEs)
and global efﬁciency of cooperation (GEC). Consider S and S′p S ∪ { j } as any two coalitions
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formed in the ﬁrst stage where S′ is obtained from the merger of coalition S and player j. A par-
tition function game exhibits PEs if and only if the payoff for a player ℓ, who is neither a mem-
ber of coalition S nor S′, is strictly higher under S′ than under S : ∏‘ ∉ S0 (S′) 1 ∏‘ ∉ S(S). PEs
mean that the merger of coalitions increases the payoffs of the non-merging players. Therefore,
IFAs are rarely self-enforcing (Yi 1997). GEC holds if and only if the aggregate payoff is strictly
higher under S′ than S : oi ∈ S0 ∏i(S′)1 o‘ ∉ S0 ∏‘(S′) 1 oi ∈ S ∏i(S)1 o‘ ∉ S ∏‘(S). GEC means
that mergers of coalitions increase the aggregate payoffs.
SCENARIOS
The four-player partition function game analyses the IFA of the Baltic salmon ﬁsheries over
a 20-year simulation period: 2011–2030. Two scenarios are considered. At ﬁrst, the players’ pay-
offs consist of commercial proﬁts, and second, the payoffs are sum of the commercial proﬁts and
recreational values. In both scenarios, the decision variables of the countries are the ﬁshing ef-
forts of the commercial ﬁsheries. The economic model parameters for the commercial ﬂeet are
from Kulmala (2009) and Kulmala et al. (2013).
SCENARIO 1: COMMERCIAL FISHERIES ONLY
In scenario 1 (S1), the payoff for each country is given by the net present value of the proﬁts
from commercial ﬁsheries. A coalition maximizes the sum of the payoffs for its members by
choosing the vector of their ﬁshing efforts (EM), given the vector of ﬁshing efforts of the single-
tons (ENM):
max
EM
o
i ∈ S
Y
i p o
i ∈ S
o
2030
yp2011
PROFy,i EM , ENMð Þ
1 1 dð Þy–2011 : (16)
Each singleton chooses the constant level of ﬁshing effort (Ej) that maximizes its own net present
value of proﬁts fromcommercialﬁsheries, given the vector of coalitionmember efforts (EM) and the
vector of ﬁshing efforts of the other singletons (ENMF{ j}):
max
Ej
Y
j ∉ S p o
2030
yp2011
PROFy,j EM , Ej, ENMj jf g
 
1 1 dð Þy–2011 : (17)
SCENARIO 2: RECREATIONAL NET BENEFITS INCLUDED
In scenario 2 (S2), the net present values of the beneﬁts from recreational ﬁsheries are included
in the players’ payoffs. A coalition, S, and each singleton, j ∉ S, solve the following problems, re-
spectively:
max
EM
o
i ∈ S
Y
i p o
i ∈ S
o
2030
yp2011
PROFy,i EM , ENMð Þ
1 1 dð Þy–2011 1 o
2030
yp2011
NBRy,i EM , ENMð Þ
1 1 dð Þy–2011
 !
(18)
max
Ej
Y
j ∉ S p o
2030
yp2011
PROFy, j EM , Ej, ENMj jf g
 
1 1 dð Þy–2011 1 o
2030
yp2011
NBRy,i EM , Ej, ENMj jf g
 
1 1 dð Þy–2011 : (19)
The coalition maximizes the aggregate payoff for its members, given by the sum of net present
values of proﬁts from commercial ﬁsheries and net recreational beneﬁts. The decision variable
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is the vector of commercial ﬁshing efforts of its members (EM), given the vector of commer-
cial ﬁshing efforts of the singletons (ENM). Each singleton chooses a constant level of com-
mercial ﬁshing effort (Ej) that maximizes its own sum of net present values of proﬁts from
commercial ﬁsheries and the net recreational beneﬁts, given the vector of coalition mem-
bers’ commercial efforts (EM) and the vector of commercial ﬁshing efforts of the other sin-
gletons (ENMF{ j}).
The payoff for Finland consists of the net present value of the LL and TN proﬁts and the net
beneﬁts of the recreational ﬁsheries from the Simojoki and Tornionjoki Rivers. Sweden’s pay-
off includes the net present value of trap net proﬁts and the net beneﬁts from recreational ﬁsh-
eries from the Tornionojoki, Kalixälven, Byskeälven, Ume/Vindelälven, and Mörrumsån rivers.
In both scenarios, the payoffs of Poland and Denmark are conﬁned to the net present value of
proﬁts from the LL ﬁsheries (table 1).
RESULTS
Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the partition function game of the two scenarios. The Nash
equilibrium ﬁshing effort strategies of each player are shown as a ratio to the reported ﬁshing
effort in the base year (2010). In the case of Finland, it is assumed that this ratio is the same
for the LL and TN gears. The payoff for each player under all possible coalition structures is also
shown. Each coalition is represented by including its members inside parentheses. For instance,
coalition structure 1 (C1) stands for the case in which all players behave non-cooperatively as
singletons. Under C2, Finland and Sweden form a coalition, whereas Poland and Denmark
are singletons. The grand coalition, composed of the four players, is represented by C12.
Table 3 shows that in scenario 1 full non-cooperation (C1) implies that all players increase
their ﬁshing effort compared to the base year. In particular, Finland chooses a ﬁshing effort
which is 3.2 times the ﬁshing effort in 2010; that is, an increase of 220%. On the other hand,
full non-cooperation (C1) in scenario 2 implies that it is optimal for Sweden to give up commer-
cial ﬁsheries and earn net beneﬁts from only the recreational ﬁsheries (table 4). In both scenar-
ios, the merger of players into coalitions increases the aggregate payoff; thus both games are
characterized by the property of GEC. For example, in scenario 2 the aggregate payoffs increase
from 64.3 million euros in non-cooperation (C1) to 139.2 million euros in a grand coalition
(C12) (table 4). In general, recreational values increase the aggregate payoffs. For the grand co-
alition (C12), in particular, payoffs are 2.5 times higher in scenario 2 than scenario 1. Moreover,
both scenarios satisfy the standard property of IFA games; i.e., PEs which mean that the merger
of coalitions increases the payoff for the non-merging players. For example, when Finland and
Sweden form coalition (C2), the payoffs for the non-merging countries, Poland and Denmark,
increase.
The stability analysis (equations (13) and (14)) shows that there are three stable coalition
structures in scenario 1 and one stable coalition structure in scenario 2. The three stable coali-
tion structures in scenario 1 are C8, C10 and C11, which are partial agreements between three
players: (FI, SE, DK), (PL, DK, FI), and (PL, DK, SE) (table 3). Under these three agreements,
due to the differences in the countries’ harvesting efﬁciency and the number of salmon available
to their ﬂeet, it is optimal to allocate all the ﬁshing effort in the commercial ﬁsheries either to
Finland or Sweden and then compensate the other countries through the AISS. In particular,
in C10—the stable coalition with the highest aggregate payoff—all the ﬁshing effort of the co-
alition (PL, DK, FI) is undertaken by Finland, with a ﬁshing effort 3.8 times that of the base year.
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Coalition structure C10 is internally stable, as the aggregate payoff for the coalition (28.5 million
euros) is larger than the sum of the free rider payoffs for Poland (6.6 million euros), Denmark
(4.7 million euros), and Finland (14.6 million euros), yielding a positive coalition surplus (2.6 mil-
lion euros). This agreement is externally stable, as Sweden has no incentive to join it. In fact, its
payoff would be reduced from 19.6 million euros to 17.8 million euros when joining coalition
structure C10 and thus forming a grand coalition.
In scenario 2, the grand coalition (C12) becomes the only stable coalition structure. The op-
timal ﬁshing strategy of this stable agreement is to give up commercial ﬁsheries and increase
Table 3. Scenario 1: Fishing Effort Strategies, Payoffs, and Stability Analysis
Stability
Coalition Structure Poland Denmark Finland Sweden Total M€ Internal External
1 PL, DK, FI, SE yes no
Strategy 1.8 2.6 3.2 1.2
Payoff 5.6 0.5 11.6 1.1 18.8
2 PL, DK, (FI, SE) yes no
Strategy 1.8 2.8 3.4* 0*
Payoff 5.8 0.6 12.5 2.0 21.0
3 PL, (DK, FI), SE yes no
Strategy 1.8 0* 3.6* 1.4
Payoff 6.6 1.8 12.9 1.9 23.1
4 (PL, FI), DK, SE yes no
Strategy 0* 6.6 3.8* 2.4
Payoff 6.9 4.7 12.9 6.0 30.5
5 PL, (DK, SE), FI yes no
Strategy 1.8 0* 3.4 1.6*
Payoff 6.7 0.8 14.1 1.4 23.0
6 (PL, SE), DK, FI no yes
Strategy 0* 6.4 4 2.4*
Payoff 5.0 4.6 20.2 0.6 30.4
7 (PL, DK), FI, SE yes no
Strategy 1.8* 0* 3.6 1.4
Payoff 5.8 0.8 14.6 1.9 23.1
8 PL, (FI, SE, DK) yes yes
Strategy 2 0* 3.6* 0*
Payoff 7.2 0.7 14.1 2.0 24.0
9 (PL, FI, SE), DK no yes
Strategy 0* 7.2 3.8* 0.4*
Payoff 4.3 5.7 18.7 4.4 33.1
10 (PL, DK, FI), SE yes yes
Strategy 0* 0* 3.8* 4.2
Payoff 7.4 5.6 15.5 19.6 48.1
11 (PL, DK, SE), FI yes yes
Strategy 0* 0* 4.6 3.8*
Payoff 7.2 5.1 30.7 2.5 45.5
12 (PL, DK, FI, SE) no yes
Strategy 0* 0* 0.8* 4.6*
Payoff 5.3 3.9 28.9 17.8 55.9
Note: Coalition members are shown in parentheses. Payoff of each player and the total payoff are in million
euros (M€). Strategy is the Nash equilibrium ﬁshing effort strategy of each player shown as a ratio to the reported
ﬁshing effort in the base year (2010).
* Strategy of the coalition member.
444 | MARINE RESOURCE ECONOMICS | VOLUME 31 NUMBER 4 2016
beneﬁts from recreational ﬁsheries. This result highlights the economic relevance of the recre-
ational ﬁsheries for Baltic salmon. Thus, in our model accounting for recreational ﬁsheries not
only changes the commercial ﬁsheries’ efforts but has also the potential to foster a higher level of
international cooperation in the management of the stock.
In our model, the optimal ﬁshing strategies imply signiﬁcant transfers between coalition
members. For instance, under the three stable coalition strictures in scenario 1 (C8, C10, and
C11), the harvest of the coalition is undertaken only by the most efﬁcient country. Hence,
the payoffs of the remaining members correspond to transfers. Although not common in inter-
Table 4. Scenario 2: Fishing Effort Strategies, Payoffs, and Stability Analysis
Stability
Coalition Structure Poland Denmark Finland Sweden Total M€ Internal External
1 PL, DK, FI, SE yes no
Strategy 2 3.8 1.2 0
Payoff 6.9 1.1 24.8 31.5 64.3
2 PL, DK, (FI, SE) yes no
Strategy 2.2 4 0* 0*
Payoff 7.6 1.2 26.9 33.6 69.3
3 PL, (DK, FI), SE yes no
Strategy 2.2 0* 1.6* 0
Payoff 8.8 2.5 26.2 32.2 69.7
4 (PL, FI), DK, SE yes no
Strategy 0* 8 2.4* 0.6
Payoff 9.7 7.1 27.6 35.7 80.1
5 PL, (DK, SE), FI no no
Strategy 2.2 0* 1.6 0*
Payoff 8.8 0.9 28.6 31.3 69.7
6 (PL, SE), DK, FI no no
Strategy 0* 8 2.4 0.6*
Payoff 5.5 7.1 37.3 30.2 80.1
7 (PL, DK), FI, SE yes no
Strategy 2.2* 0* 1.6 0
Payoff 7.3 1.5 28.6 32.2 69.7
8 PL, (FI, SE, DK) yes no
Strategy 2.2 0* 0* 0*
Payoff 10.2 4.4 31.9 35.4 81.9
9 (PL, FI, SE), DK yes no
Strategy 0* 9.6 0* 0*
Payoff 9.7 9.9 39.4 37.9 96.9
10 (PL, DK, FI), SE yes no
Strategy 0* 0* 3.4* 2.4
Payoff 10.7 8.9 30.5 48.3 98.4
11 (PL, DK, SE), FI yes no
Strategy 0* 0* 3.4 2.4*
Payoff 8.9 7.1 50.0 32.3 98.4
12 (PL, DK, FI, SE) yes yes
Strategy 0* 0* 0* 0*
Payoff 15.3 15.1 55.2 53.5 139.2
Note: Coalition members are shown in parentheses. Payoff of each player and the total payoff are in million
euros (M€). Strategy is the Nash equilibrium ﬁshing effort strategy of each player shown as a ratio to the reported
ﬁshing effort in the base year (2010).
* Strategy of the coalition member.
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national shared ﬁsheries, transfers, or side payments, have been applied in some IFAs. Miller
et al. (2013) refer to the case of the Paciﬁc Salmon Treaty between the USA and Canada. They
also point out that the advantages of transfers to foster cooperation in shared ﬁsheries have been
discussed at the international policy level (e.g., FAO 2002; Lodge et al. 2007).
IMPLICATIONS FOR SALMON STOCKS
As shown in the previous section, IFAs on Baltic salmon can take many forms in terms of mem-
ber countries and harvesting strategies. Hence, the various IFAs have different impacts on the
salmon stocks. Figure 2 illustrates the number of juvenile salmon (smolts) under the different
scenarios and respective stable coalition structures. Not surprisingly, full cooperation under sce-
nario 2, where the commercial ﬁsheries would not operate, yields the highest number of smolts.
The result is subject to the assumption of a constant harvest rate of recreational ﬁsheries.2
Moreover, the grand coalition in scenario 2 is the only case in which the management objective,
75% of the estimated median smolt production capacity, is always met at the end of the simu-
lation period.
According to ﬁgure 2, the stable coalition structure with the highest aggregate payoff in sce-
nario 1 (S1/C10) achieves the management objective during the simulation period for all rivers
but Simojoki. Another interesting result is that for the majority of rivers, non-cooperation in
scenario 2 (S2/C1) yields a higher number of smolts than the stable partial cooperative agree-
ment with the highest aggregate payoff in scenario 1 (S1/C10). Overall, the main message that
emerges from ﬁgure 2 is that accounting for the beneﬁts of recreational ﬁsheries is generally pos-
itive in terms of stock conservation. In fact, under stable agreements the stock, at the end of the
simulation period, is always higher in scenario 2. The same holds true for full non-cooperation
(C1), with the exception of the Mörrum River.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This article studies the impact of non-market values on the stability of an international ﬁsher-
ies agreement on Baltic salmon. The results obtained, excluding non-market values, are in line
with earlier studies, showing that coalition formation increases incentives for free riding; hence,
IFAs are rarely self-enforcing (Pintassilgo 2003; Kulmala et al. 2013). By including non-market
values we show that the level of cooperation among harvesting countries increases, and despite
the existence of PEs, it is possible to achieve a stable grand coalition. This outcome depends on
the overall structure of the ﬁshery and cannot be generalized. What we can conclude from our
applied study is that accounting for recreational beneﬁts may affect the level of cooperation in a
ﬁshery, possibly due to the increased asymmetry between countries. Following Pintassilgo et al.
(2010), it seems plausible to expect that accounting for recreational beneﬁts will increase (de-
crease) the level of cooperation if it increases (decreases) the asymmetry between the harvest-
ing countries. In our model, accounting for recreational beneﬁts helps not only to achieve the
grand coalition but also to ensure that the biological management objective is met. Furthermore,
the results show that considering the beneﬁts from recreational ﬁsheries may signiﬁcantly affect
optimal ﬁshing strategies. Taking into account these beneﬁts leads to a decrease in the ﬁshing
2. In practice, however, increasing the number of salmon ascending the rivers might attract more anglers. Nonetheless, given
their relatively low efﬁciency compared to operators with commercial gear, the result indicating the largest number of smolts oc-
curring under the grand coalition in scenario 2 should hold.
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Figure 2. The Number of Smolts for the Two Scenarios (S) with the Respective Non-cooperative Solutions
(C1) and the Cooperative Stable Coalition Structures with the Highest Payoffs (C10 and C12)
Note: The horizontal dotted lines show themanagement objective: 75% of the estimatedmedian smolt pro-
duction capacity (ICES 2012).
effort of commercial ﬁsheries. This is an expected result, as recreational beneﬁts increase due to
the stock level that escapes from commercial ﬁshing. Hence, this result should generally hold for
any other salmon ﬁshery.
In the two scenarios considered herein, the IFA game on Baltic salmon exhibits the stan-
dard properties of PE and GEC. This means that the more countries that join the agreement,
the larger the aggregate payoffs from the ﬁshery and the payoffs for non-members and, conse-
quently, the free-rider incentives. Thus, the ‘paradox of cooperation’ is observed. In scenario 1,
excluding recreational beneﬁts, full cooperation yields around three times the aggregate payoff
of non-cooperation, yet it cannot be achieved. However, in scenario 2, which considers recreational
beneﬁts, achieving full cooperation is relatively less important in terms of aggregate payoff, but is
achieved.
Our case study also show that when recreational beneﬁts are accounted for, countries may
ﬁnd it optimal to give up commercial ﬁsheries in order to increase the beneﬁts from recreational
ﬁsheries. This is in line with the ﬁndings of Laukkanen (2001); Olaussen (2007); and Kulmala,
Laukkanen, and Michielsens (2008), showing the economic beneﬁts of the reallocation of salmon
catch. Overall, our results on Baltic salmon highlight the economic relevance of recreational
ﬁsheries and its implications in terms of ﬁshing allocation policies and international ﬁsheries
management. However, as pointed out by Holzer and McConnell (2014) and Abbott (2015),
to derive management recommendations from bioeconomic models it is necessary to consider
the institutional setting of the ﬁshery at hand, since modeling results are conditional on the as-
sumptions about institutional arrangements for quota allocations. At present, the TAC regime
for Baltic salmon considers commercial ﬁsheries only. Estimating the economically and eco-
logically sound quota for commercial and recreational ﬁsheries would be a worthy extension
of the model. Moreover, considering the effect of angler heterogeneity on the stability of the
grand coalition and on size of the commercial and recreational quota might yield empirical ﬁnd-
ings with policy relevance.
Among the limitations of our model are the assumptions of constant prices and constant
costs per unit of effort. These classical assumptions create a polar setting. In scenario 1, constant
costs per unit of effort make it optimal for stable coalitions to concentrate all the ﬁshing effort of
the commercial ﬁsheries on the most efﬁcient country. The concentration would occur only par-
tially if increasing marginal costs from ﬁshing were considered. In scenario 2, the assumption of
constant prices makes it optimal for the grand coalition to cease commercial ﬁshing. If down-
ward sloping demand curves for ﬁsh were considered, the reduction in effort of the commercial
ﬁsheries would not have been so dramatic. Hence, our results regarding the allocation of ﬁshing
effort among the different countries and ﬁsheries should be understood as a benchmark.
The management of an internationally shared ﬁsh stock, such as Baltic salmon, is highly
complex and cannot be fully captured through the game theoretical approach provided herein.
The main message that our case study highlights is that accounting for non-market values, such
as the beneﬁts from recreational ﬁsheries, may have signiﬁcant impacts on the formation and
stability of IFAs. A natural avenue for further research on this topic is to explore the impacts of
recreational beneﬁts on IFAs in a theoretical framework. This could help to understand under
which conditions the level of cooperation can increase when recreational beneﬁts are accounted
for. Another worthwhile extension would be a game setting where different recreational and com-
mercial ﬁsheries are the players. Alternatively, in each country, the bargaining between the differ-
ent ﬁsheries over ﬁshing effort could be considered. Moreover, our ﬁndings call for more theoret-
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ical work on the functional form of the recreational net beneﬁts and data collection related to the
number of recreational anglers and their preferences.
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